The philosophy of mind is the branch of metaphysics that studies the nature of mind, what it is that makes us conscious beings. The central question in the field is whether the mind is material or immaterial: are we merely physical beings, or something more? Do we have immaterial souls that animate our bodies, or are we merely electrical activity in an organic brain?
Substance Dualism
Substance dualism is well-established among non-philosophers. It is the view that there are two fundamentally different types of substance--physical and non-physical--and that human beings are made up of two components: physical bodies and non-physical minds. This theory has many attractions, but is now seen by many, rightly or wrongly, as old-fashioned and naive.
Substance Monism
In opposition to substance dualism is substance monism, the view that there is no distinction between the mental and physical realms, that everything is fundamentally the same. Although it is possible to argue that everything is mental, as idealism does, it is much more common to hold that everything is physical, to endorse “physicalism” or “materialism”.
Materialism
The theory of choice for many scientists is materialism, which denies the existence of strange, non-physical substances and insists that we are entirely physical beings. Materialist theories attempt to reduce mentality to physicality, analysing mental states in terms of physical states. There are various such analyses available: behaviourismanalyses mental states in terms of behaviour; functionalism analyses mental states in terms of their functional role; mind-brain identity theory identifies mental states with brain states.
Property Dualism
There is, however, a third option: property dualism. Property dualism is substance monist; it agrees with materialism that there are only physical substances. However, it concedes to the dualist that these substances have both physical and non-physical properties, and that the non-physical properties cannot be fully explained in purely physical terms. Although this position is intended to capture the best elements of both positions, it arguably ends up with the liabilities of both as well.
Substance Dualism
Substance dualism is well-established among non-philosophers. It is the view that there are two fundamentally different types of substance--physical and non-physical--and that human beings are made up of two components: physical bodies and non-physical minds. This theory has many attractions, but is now seen by many, rightly or wrongly, as old-fashioned and naive.
Substance Monism
In opposition to substance dualism is substance monism, the view that there is no distinction between the mental and physical realms, that everything is fundamentally the same. Although it is possible to argue that everything is mental, as idealism does, it is much more common to hold that everything is physical, to endorse “physicalism” or “materialism”.
Materialism
The theory of choice for many scientists is materialism, which denies the existence of strange, non-physical substances and insists that we are entirely physical beings. Materialist theories attempt to reduce mentality to physicality, analysing mental states in terms of physical states. There are various such analyses available: behaviourismanalyses mental states in terms of behaviour; functionalism analyses mental states in terms of their functional role; mind-brain identity theory identifies mental states with brain states.
Property Dualism
There is, however, a third option: property dualism. Property dualism is substance monist; it agrees with materialism that there are only physical substances. However, it concedes to the dualist that these substances have both physical and non-physical properties, and that the non-physical properties cannot be fully explained in purely physical terms. Although this position is intended to capture the best elements of both positions, it arguably ends up with the liabilities of both as well.
